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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UT'AH
WILLIA~I

E. FRENCH,
Appellant,

Case No.
7396

vs.
UTAH OIL REFINING COMPANY,
a c.orporation,
·Respondent.

Brief of Respondent
STATE:\IENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is, to say the least,
meager and partisan. It is in about the same class as his
pleading. Had plaintiff's complaint alleged the facts
as shown by the evidence the case probably could have
been decided upon a general demurrer instead of requiring a trial. A fair reading of the complaint would indicate that plaintiff entered the intersection from the east
and was proceeding westerly through the intersection.
Also. it will be observed that there is a total absence in
the complaint of any reference to the fact that the traffic
\\Tns controlled by signal lights and a significant absence
1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of any allegation about a left hand turn in the intersection by plaintiff. The complaint bears evidence of a
deceptive and misleading pleading. The statement of
facts in plaintiff's brief i13 of the same caliber.
It is, of course, axiomatic that plaintiff's case is no
stronger than his own evidence and as the cross-examination leaves it.
When plaintiff entered the intersection from the
south the light was green for north and south bound
traffic. He testified on cross-examination (R. 11-12)
that he first saw defendant's truck to the north and on
the opposite side of the intersection, ''I was in the intersection, just over the walk.'' .A. nd he saw the Oil Company tanker 100 to 120 feet a""Nay. That was when he
first saw it. The truck was running at normal speed,
about twenty-five miles per hour (R. 12).
There was a car ahead of plaintiff's ear, also making a left hand turn, and the next time plaintiff saw the
tank truck of defendant it \Vas about six feet away from
him. It was practically upon him (R. 12). 'Vhile he first
testified that he attempted to keep both of these cars
within his vision, he finally testified (R. 13) that he
didn't know whether he observed the tank truck of
defendant between the time that he observed it 100 to 120
feet away and the time he next saw it six feet away. "I
don't know vvhether I observed it or not."
During this time plaintiff made a left ha11d turn (R.
14). There \vere a number of other cars in the intersection
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at the time. It is a street carrying henvy traffic (R. 14).
Plaintiff \Yas follo\ving the rn r in front of him within
three or four feet.
The front wheel of my rar \vas right on the cross\v·alk \vhen it \Vas hit on the rig·ht rear wheel (R. 20).
Right after the areident plaintiff told l\1r. Olson
(the driYer of defendant's truck) that he thought hH
had time to make the turn (R. 16); and told Mr. Porter
(defendant's claim adjuster) that he was under the traffic light, in the intersection, when he first noticed the tank
truck (R. 18). He also testified as follows, upon direct
examination (R. 3-6) :

"Q. What \Yas it, if anything, that caused the collision, if there \Yas a eollision ~
''A. Well, there \vas a car ahead of me and I
couldn't get out quite fast enough.
traveling~

"Q.

How fast Vlere you

"A.

About eight miles an hour."

He also testified that he examined the tracks after
the accident and if the truck had gone straight thHre
was plenty of room to miss his car but. it swung to the
west .
.Jir. Reeves, \vho VtTas vvith plaintiff in his car, testified that when they \\Tere making the left turn the signal
light turned yello\v, at Vtrhich time defendant's truck was
•)

,)
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125, maybe 150 feet, away. It hadn't entered the intersection; and that it was coming fairly fast, 25 miles
per hour.
On cross-examination, however, he testified that
when plaintiff entered the intersection from the south
that he saw the tank truck and that, at that time, the
truck was probably 50 feet north of the crosswalk (about
150 or 140 feet from plaintiff's car to the north), at which
time the light 'vas green (R. 36, 37 and 25). The width
of the intersection was about 90 feet.
He also testified that plaintiff was 30 feet behind the
car in front of him (R. 37). He also testified that the
tank truck 'vas in the west lane of traffic on the west side
of Second West (R. 38).

'' Q. What did you say the distance was between
the French car and the Utah Oil truck: When you arrived
at a position west and south of the semaphore~
"A. It "\Vas about half the width of the pavement."
(About 45 feet).
He also testified,

'' Q. When you started to turn do you know whether
or not the Utah Oil truck had entered the intersection~
''A. When we started to turn it was crossing the
side-walk. It ha.dn 't crossed the side,valk when we saw
it (the light) turn."
4
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He also testified (R. 41) that the trurk veered ahout
forty feet to the ,,·est. On t;ross-examination he testified
(R. 43) that at the time of impact the Utah Oil truck
"~as \Yithin ten to t"~el ve feet of the \vest crosswalk.
Plaintiff then \Yas called for further direct examination (R. ±-!) and tt stified that he was at a point marked
"1" on the diagram on the board (not in evidence) when
he sa\\- the tanker 120 feet a\vay. On cross-examination,
ho'\vever, this point \Yas fixed at six feet from the point
of impact (R. -!3) and that he went six feet at eight miles
per hour \vhile the truck 'vas going 120 feet at 20 or 25
miles per hour (an impossibility "~hich no one \Vas obligated to believe).
1

It makes no difference \vhich of these vanous
stories plaintiff adopts as the one which he will stick to,
he is guilty of contributory negligence under the statutes
and decisions of this court ; and he is not relieved of his
negligenee by the last clear chance rule.
Under story No. 1 as told by himself he entered the
intersection when the light \Yas green, at "\Vhich time the
truck \vas 100 to 120 feet from him about 40 feet north
of the north crosswalk. He \Vas driving eight miles per
hour and the truck was coming 20 to 25 miles per hour
on the west lane of the west side of the highway, and
he made a left hand turn follo·\ving another car in front
of the truck, and ''"'as hit because he thought he could
make it and because his car didn't take up as fast as he
thought it \Yould.
5
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2. On his story No. 2 as told by himself he didn't
see the truck until six feet from the point of impact, at
which time the truck was 120 feet away. He was traveling eight miles per hour and the truck was going 20 to
25 miles per hour. It is pure mathematics that if he went
six feet at eight miles per hour, the truck at 25 miles
per hour did not go to exceed 20 feet between the time he
saw it and the time of the colli~ion. To travel100 to 120
feet in the distance that plaintif was going six feet at
eight miles per hour, :the truck would have to go about
144 miles per hour, which was contrary to his own evidence and which no one had to believe and which the
court was at liberty to disregard.
3. On story No. 3 as told by Reeves, the truck \Vas
40 feet away when they drove in front of it. His story
that the truck was in the west lane of travel and that it
veered 30 to 40 feet west from its position on the highway
and collided "\\ith plaintiff's car ten or twelve feet east
of the west crosswalk is another miracle that no one had
to believe. The fact remained that according to his story
plaintiff drove in front of the truck when it was 40 feet
away, according to one story; 100 to 120 feet away according to another story; and when plaintiff was six
feet from the point of impact according to another story;
and in all stories defendant's oncoming truck was traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour.

6
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ARGUl\IENT
Plaintiff \Yas guilty of contributory negligence upon
his O\\?n eYidence and upon the evidence of Reeves.
1. He violated Section 37-7-137 U.C.A. 1943 in that
he failed to yield the right of way to defendant's truck
'vhich had either entered the intersection or was so close
as to constitute an immediate hazard.
2. He Yiola ted Section 57-7-133 U. C.A. 1943 in that
he turned his Yehicle from a direct course northward to
\\~esterly when such moYement could not be made with
reasonable safet)~.
3. He negligently and carelessly drove and operated
his car into the pathway of defendant's oncoming vehicle
in disregard of the hazard to himself and his car when it
was so close as to constitute a hazard, regardless of any
question of right of way.
Plaintiff's own evidence justified the court in directing a verdict for defendant. He certainly was not helped
by the evidence of defendant's witnesses, nor it is necessary to consider that evidence in passing upon the question presented by this appeal. It is necessary only to cite
recently decided cases to sustain the trial court.
Hart vs. Kerr, 110 Utah 479, 175 Pac. 2d 475.
In that case plaintiff made a left turn in front of an
oncoming vehicle 300 feet away which was coming at 40
miles per hour. This court held he was guilty of contributory negligence. In this case under one story he made
7
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the left hand turn when the oncoming vehicle was 100 to
120 feet away, and under another story it was 40 feet
away. Under all of the stories the oncoming vehicle was
coming at 20 to 25 miles per hour.
Cederloff vs. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 Pac. 2d 777.
In that case defendant drove his car in front of plaintiff's oncoming vehicle at a slow rate of speed. This
court held he was guilty of negligence as a matter of
law and that a verdict should have been direeted for
plaintiff who had a right to assum~ that he would stop
before entering the other lane of traffic.
"Section 57-7-133, U.C.A. 1943, provides:
' (a.) No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct
course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety * * *.'
Defendant turned his car from a direct course in
the highway into the lane of traffic intended for
vehicles traveling in the opposite direction at a
time when plaintiff's car was approaching in
such close proximity that the collision occurred
as soon as the front end of defendant's ear had
reached a few feet into plaintiff's lane of traffic.
Had plaintiff's car run into the rear end of defendant's car after the front end thereof had entirely crossed plaintiff's course of travel, there
might have been some question whether the turn
could be made with reasonable safety, but under
the facts in this case it is clear that as a matter of
laV\r the turn could not be made with reasonable
safety, and the defendant was guilty of negligence.
The defendant's testimony that he looked and did
not see any car coming does not help his situation,
beeause if he had paid attention to what was there
to be seen he "rould have seen plaintiff's car com8
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ing, ns it \vas approaching in the immediate vicinity, and there is no claim that it did not have
proper lights. It is equally clear that such nHgligence of the defendant \vas at least one of the
proximate causes of the accident. The accident
\\Tas the immediate and direct result of this neglig·ence, and \vithout such negligence it would not
have occurred.''
Sine Y. Salt Lake rrransportation Co., 106
Utah 289, 147 Par. 2d 875.
There this court held that regardless of right of way,
it is negligence to driYe in front of an oncoming vehicle.
See also:
Bullock

YS.

Luke, 98 Utah 501, 28 Pac. 2d 350.

~Iingus

vs. Olsson, ________ Utah ________ , 201 Pac. 2d 495.

Conklin vs. Walsh, ________ Utah ________ , 193 Pac. 2d 437.
Hickok vs. Skinner, ______ Utah ______ , 190 Pa·c. 2d 514.
This court also considered the same statute as applied to a criminal case in State vs. Newton, 105 Utah 561,
144 Pac. 2d 290, where the facts were not far different
from this case and where this court used very strong language in describing those who make left turns at intersections into the path of oncoming vehicles.
In this last case the vehicle was 400 or 500 feet away
when plaintiff last sa\v it. He was held to be negligent as
a matter of law.
This case is stronger against plaintiff than most of
those cases. Under his first story and under his second
~)
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story if you believe· his evidence (which was positive that
the truck was going 20 to 25 miles per hour) the truck
was not over 40 feet away when he drove: 6 feet in front
of it. You can disregard the evidence of Olsson, defendant's driver, that he veered to the right in an effort to
avoid the collision when he saw that plaintiff was not
going to stop, but such is the only reasonable conclusion
from plaintiff's own evidence. Plaintiff and his witness
Reeves both said ''it happened so fast''. It could only
happen that fast if they were in such close· proximity as
to constitute an immediate hazard and a violation of both
statutes.
This case IS also much stronger against plaintiff
than some of those cases in that some of the parties involved in those cases claimed not to have seen the oncoming vehicles. In this case both plaintiff and .his witness
claimed to have seen it and neither of them testified that
they thought it would stop or that plaintiff attempted to
stop; although plaintiff in his revised version of his
story said he didn't see the truck at all until six feet
from the point of impact, at which time it was 100 to 120
feet away, coming at 20 to 25 miles per hour. In his
original edition lie said he saw it when he first entered
the intersection and again saw it just before the impact.
In either case he was negligent, because in his first edition he saw it coming and failed to stop, and in his
revised edition he didn't see it at all until just befor~
the impact. If that was the fact he was negligent in failing to look.

10
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There are t''To stories in this case which are not
entitled to credence because palpably impossible under
the testimony.
1. That defendant's truck went 120 feet at 20 to
25 miles per hour while plaintiff's car traveled six feet
at eight miles per hour. It just can't be done according
to any mathematics· and conflicts with the positive
testimony of plaintiff to the contrary.
2. That defendant's truck was driving in the west
lane of the 'vest side of the street, veered 30 or 40 feet
to the west and hit plaintiff's car 10 to 12 feet east of
the west crosswalk. It just can't be done. The intersection \Yas 90 feet each way, 45 feet on each side of the
center; two lanes on each side of the center. If defendant's truck veered 30 or 40 feet to the west from its position in the west lane, it was clear out of the intersection
and couldn't have hit plaintiff's car 10 or 12 feet east of
the west crosswalk.
In passing upon the motion for directed verdict it
was not necessary for the court to disregard this wholly
unbelievable evidence, although under the decisions of
this court it could have done so. But even if you believe
the unbelievable you still arrive at the same result under
our statutes and decisions.
Plaintiff seems to feel that the quotation from Blashfield and Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pac. 2d 510,
are authority for having the case go to a jury, on the
theory that defendant was proceeding through the intersection on an amber light.
11
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We have not discussed in this appeal whether plaintiff was or was not negligent. That issue- is beside the
point. The only question here is whether plaintiff, under
his evidence, was guilty of contributory negligence. In
this connection, however, it will be noted that plaintiff
did not plead a violation of the statute or an ordinance
in that regard. Nowhere in the complaint does he allege
that defendant went through an amber light, as an act of
negligence.
We could well argue that he failed to prove any negligence of defendant as alleged but on this appeal that
question is beside the issue because the case was decided
by_ the trial court on the ground that the uncontradicted
evidence established by plaintiff's own evidence showed
contributory negligence on his part.
The case of Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pac.
2d 510, does not help plaintiff. In that case the defendant
ran a stop sign and the plaintiff might have had reasonable grounds for believing that defendant would stop
under one view of the evidence as to the speed that the
ambulance was travelling. The court found that plaintiff was negligent but let the case go to the jury on the
question as to whether his negligence proximately contributed to the accident. In this case the plaintiff saw
the· defendant's car coming at 20 to 25 miles per hour,
made a left turn in front of it because he thought he
could make it and he says the reason he didn't make it
was because his car didn't get away as fast as he thought
it would. Under any of his stories he made a left turn
1~
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in front of an oncoming cnr that he knew, according to
his own testimony, ""as. at most 100 to 120 feet away,
and "·hich was coming through the intersection at 20 to
25 miles per hour either on a. green light or a light that
had just turned amber 'vhen the truck was about to
enter. There "·as no doubt as to the fact that p~lain
tiff 's negligence contributed to the accident because he
testified that he was hit about six feet from the time he
looked (""hether first or last, according to which of his
stories you aeeept) and sa'v the truck coming.
Certainly if it was negligence in the above recently
decided cases, then plaintiff was negligent in this case
under any of his stories.
It is most significant in this case that plaintiff failed
to plead as an act of negligence of defendant that defendant proceeding through the intersection in violation
of the traffic control signal. This fact alone distinguishes
the case at bar from the Hess case.

LAST CLEAR CI-IANCE
Plaintiff says he was entitled to go to the jury on the
doctrine of last clear chance under the doctrine of
Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 Pac. 2d 230.
In the first place plaintiff did not plead any such
ground of negligence. He rested his case on a denial of
any negligence on his part. Last clear chance must he
pleaded if it is relied upon as a ground of negligence or as
a defense to allegations of contributory negligence.
13
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38 Am .Juris. 960, Sec. 271 under Negligence.
If plaintiff had pleaded last clear chance, which he
did not, he still would not bring himself within the doctrine. He was tlie one, and the only one, who had the last
clear chance- to- a void the accident. According to his
evidence he was going only eight miles per hour when he
made the left turn into the path of the oncoming truck.
It is a fair assumption that he could have- stopped before
reaching the ·west lane of the west side of the street.
He saw the truck coming and was able to approximate
its s.peed at 20 to 25 miles per hour and according to his
revised story it was 100 to 120 feet away. Why didn't he
stop~ He undoubtedly could have. He says he thought
he could make it but his car didn't get away as fast as
he thought it would. The doctrine of last clear chance puts
the burden on him-not the other fellow, who has a right
to assume that he will not violate the law by failing to
yield the right of way. In the case of Graham v. Johnson,
cited by plaintiff, the defendant knew the boys were playing in the street in violation of the ordinance. She had
stopped 49 feet from them and then moved slowly in their
direction, knowing that they were playing, failed to
honk or warn them, and this court held it was a jury
question as to whether she still could have stopped after
a boy yelled to the Graham boy to look out. Plaintiff's
position is akin to the Johnson gir1, not the Graham
boy. That is an entirely different proposition than
plaintiff's case. And in that case Mr. Justice Wolfe said
that the doctorine would apply only if the Johnson girl
had ample time to stop or other\vise, by the sound of the
14
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horn, avoid the accident. He gaTe an illustration of nn
intersection ease \Yhere it \vould apply, as a stalled car
\vhere the defendant had ample time to stop or avoid the
accident. He also \Yarned that the doctrine should be
guarded against misapplication and that the word
"clear'' ,,~as a Yery significant part of it, in the following
language:
''But in the last clear chance doctrine the
\vord 'clear' has significance. In a. case such as
this \Yhen both parties are more or less rapidly
changing· their positions the evidence must be
clear and conYincing that the party whom it is
claimed could have avoided the aecident had a
'clear' chance to do so."
~ir.

Justice \\T olfe also wrote the very recent. opinion in the ca.se of Holmgren vs. Union Pacific, 198 Pac.
2d ±59, "Therein the same doctrine was considered and discussed and applied to a railroad accident and similar language \Yas used as bet\veen two moving vehicles.
Another excellent discussion of the doctrine is contained in Horsley Ys. Robinson, ________ Utah -~------, 186 Pac.
2d 592, particularly in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe, \\.,.herein among other things the following
is said:
''A driver is not ordinarily required to anticipate that another \vill have gotten out of his
proper path of travel and that he, the driver
must drive so as to create for some other a last ·
elear chance opportunity. 1\.. driver of a car does
not carry with him an anticipatory last clear
chance obligation. Sueh obligation arises only
after the operator of the vehicle is or should be

15
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aware of the position of the other,. who, being in
a position of danger, is unaware of his peril, or,
if aware, unable timely to extricate himself
from it."

A similar result was reached in Richards v. Palace
Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439, where the doctrine~ sought to be applied by a bicycle rider who rode
from the east to the west side of the center of a street and
fell in front of a motor bus which was 25 or 30 feet away,
approaching at nine miles per hour.
Cases are legion holding that the doctrine does not
apply to a case of this kind where the plaintiff drove in
front of an oncoming vehicle by making a left turn in
violation of t\vo statutes when he actually saw the other
car so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Plaintiff's witness Reeves testified (R. 40-41) that the truck
was about half the width of the pavement aw~y when
they were south and west of the semaphore (making the
left turn) and plaintiff said in his revised story the
truck was six feet away when he first saw it, and in his
first story that it was six feet away when he saw it for
the second time. What has this situation to do with
the doctrine of last clear chance, even if it had been
pleaded~

\V e respectfully submit that the trial court properly
directed a verdict upon the evidence most favorable to
plaintiff.

Respectfully submitted,
RICI-I AND ELTON,
Attorneys for Responde,nt.
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